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Abstract 
Nowadays, policy makers in charge of designing innovation policies, especially 
at the regional level, are more and more looking at the cluster approach either with a 
view to accelerate the existing clusters or for providing the basis for the emergence of 
new ones. In fact, not only as a consequence of their appeal as an interactive and 
territorially embedded vision of innovation but also owing to a lot of other reasons, 
clusters are usually considered as key instruments for promoting competitiveness, 
industrial development, innovation and growth. 
But, although cluster policies have a potential for generating benefits, the 
presence of potential benefits from cluster initiatives is not per se a sufficient foundation 
or a validation for policymakers to get involved, since clustering is something that has 
been happening spontaneously during time. The key question is whether and how 
policymakers can add value through appropriate measures, beyond the outcomes that 
markets and market players produce on their own.  
While there is an extensive literature that focuses on the cluster analysis, the 
connection between clusters and policy has been mainly ignored. This paper tries to 
shed light on this issue, highlighting the key features of both the cluster concept and 
policy. It also aims at contributing to diminish the existing gap between theory and 
policy comparing two broad models of cluster policy: the Asian and the OECD 
approach. 
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1. Introduction  
There has been an increasing rhetoric about creating and supporting local industrial 
clusters. The immediate reason is because political leaders and development agencies 
generally assume that industrial clusters play a key role in regional development 
(Brachert et al, 2011), not only by boosting innovation (OECD, 1999) but also by acting 
as drivers of competitiveness (Lagendijk, 1999, Morgan and Nauwelærs, 1999, Storper, 
1995) and usually empirical studies do not contradict these theses (Enright 1996; 
Isaksen 1997; Cooke 2001; Rosenthal and Strange, 2004; Spencer et al. 2009)1. 
Moreover, research in economic geography and regional science has empirically shown 
that agglomeration has been positively associated with productivity at the local level 
both in the US and in Europe (e.g., Ciccone and Hall, 1998; Ciccone, 2002). So, it is not 
surprising that building clusters has quickly changed from a ‘fad’ to a ‘guiding principle’ of 
economic development policy (Raines, 2002).  
Although the study and discussion of industrial agglomeration has a long history in 
academic community discussions, it was the Porter’s competitiveness concept that put it 
in the front page. In fact, it was only after Michael Porter (1990) has examined the 
industrial agglomeration from the firm perspective that the theme surpassed the 
restricted circles of economists and geographers. Porter’s consultant work, alone or in 
association with his Monitor Company, has contributed to the wide diffusion of cluster 
strategies in many countries (Benneworth et al., 2003; Rosenfeld, 2005).  
But the Porter’s approach to industrial agglomerations helped not only to impose a 
concept and to justify clusters as targets for public policy, but also it has created a 
global demand for consultants with policies to fit it, and this has had a cumulative effect 
on the popularity of clusters. As Rosenfeld (2005: 4) has noted, this increasing demand 
of consultants can explain, almost partly, why industry clusters have moved from a 
“relatively obscure idea situated on the periphery of economic development to a core 
practice”. 
Since the image of high productivity, prosperity, decentralization and 
entrepreneurship associated to the cluster brand has helped to promote the idea that a 
socially progressive local economy can be achieved by policy makers wherever regions 
are located and whatever instruments are used, some authors consider cluster policy 
                                                 
1
 Of course, there are exceptions (e.g., Perry, 2010a).  
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popularity more as a result of the use of techniques of ‘brand management’ than as a 
genuine intellectual discourse (Martin and Sunley, 2003, Perry, 2010b).  
Some other criticisms are directed to both the Porter-inspired cluster developments 
that gave policy professionals a rationalization for local intervention and to the 
proposed universal policy therapy that assures sustained growth to any locality or region 
(Perry, 2010b). Policy makers in many countries and regions view these developments 
as advice to combine cluster support with any type of intervention, from simply 
recognizing the presence of a cluster to the complete promotion of entirely new clusters.  
But there are many other criticisms: first, because in designing policy programmes, 
policy-makers often do not take into account some basic aspects of a cluster policy, 
applying the same measures to all supported local clusters within a programme (Brenner 
and Schlump, 2011). Second, the scientific literature rarely provides recommendations 
on how to select adequate policy measures in order to support clusters. In fact, while 
there does exist an extensive literature that deals with the cluster analysis, the 
connection between this analysis and policy has been mainly ignored (Lorenzen, 2001). 
In face of the controversy about the cluster policy and from a regional policy 
standpoint two questions are mandatory: first, can policy be effective in making appear 
new clusters? Second, assuming its effectiveness, what is the appropriate policy for 
enforcing the clustering development and by that means promoting regional economic 
growth?  
The answer to the first question depends on the characteristics of clusters and on 
the effectiveness of policy instruments to replicate such characteristics. Respecting to 
the second question, there is not a consensual answer, as stated elsewhere (Pessoa, 
2011). The debate is polarized around two extreme positions: on the one hand, the 
classical optimal-policy perspective (Rodríguez-Clare, 2007) and on the other the 
Porter’s policy prescriptions2. These extreme positions have a counterpart in two 
different regional patterns: the Asian model and the OECD model. 
Accordingly, the remainder of this paper is organized as follows. After reflecting 
on the concept of cluster and on its key features in section 2, section 3 deals with the 
                                                 
2
 These prescriptions are synthesized in Woodward and Guimaraes (2009): i) support the development of 
all clusters, not choose among them; ii) reinforce established and promising clusters rather than attempt to 
create entirely new ones; iii) cluster initiatives are advanced by the private sector, with government as 
facilitator; iv) development should not be guided by top-down policy strategies. 
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difficulties in translating the key features highlighted by cluster analyses in policy 
principles and instruments. Next, section 4 calls attention to the need of making cluster 
policy suitable for the (actual or desirable) regional context. Section 5 presents two 
broad models of cluster policy, contrasting the OECD approach with the Asian one. 
Finally, section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. Clusters: key characteristics 
 
Since the 1990s, Michael Porter's work about ‘clusters’ has increasingly established 
the standard in the field, and accordingly Porter's cluster model has been proposed in 
significant parts of the world as a tool for promoting national, regional, and local 
competitiveness, innovation and growth. In fact, very quickly clusters called the 
attention of many leaders in many regions, and consequently the cluster related concepts 
were extended promptly to go with local circumstances and expectations. However, at 
least a large part of the popularity of clusters lies in its vagueness and definitional 
elusiveness (Martin and Sunley, 2003) and it is likely that it would be this ambiguity 
that allows both to apply the cluster concept to different realities and to prevent an 
accurate policy evaluation. Furthermore the tendency to oversimplify, which is 
associated to the vulgarisation of the definition of “cluster”, permits to find clusters 
everywhere. In effect, both individual researchers and development agencies have 
identified in recent years clusters so diverse as ranging in size from two to thousands 
companies, enveloping territories as small as a neighbourhood and as large as nations, 
and comprising highly specialized members as defined by a four digit industry code and 
as broadly defined as “high tech”. In today’s policy world, clusters are acquiring “the 
discreet charm of obscure objects of desire” as, citing Steiner (1998, p. 1), Martin and 
Sunley (2003) have reminded.  
So, there is a lot of confusion around the cluster concept. A key characteristic of 
clusters is the interdependence among firms. This interdependence gives clustered firms 
certain advantages over isolated firms. But is this interdependence a sufficient condition 
for classifying any association of firms (for instance, a network) as a cluster? In our 
view the answer is negative.  
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In fact, there are other groups of firms characterized by interdependence (i.e., firms 
are dependent on assets controlled by other partners). For instance, both clusters and 
networks are characterised by independence and interdependence at the same time. But, 
there are significant differences between clusters and networks (Rosenfeld, 2005). 
According to Ceglie et al (1999: 270) “the term network refers to a group of firms that 
co-operate on a joint development project – complementing each other and specialising 
in order to overcome common problems, achieve collective efficiency and conquer 
markets beyond their individual reach”. On the other hand the term cluster is used to 
indicate a “sectoral and geographical concentration of enterprises which, first, gives rise 
to external economies (such as the emergence of specialised suppliers of raw materials 
and components or the growth of a pool of sector specific skills) and, second, favours 
the rise of specialised services in technical, administrative and financial matters. Such 
specialised services create an encouraging ground for the development of a network of 
public and private local institutions which support local economic development by 
promoting collective learning and innovation through implicit and explicit co-
ordination” (Ceglie et al, 1999: 270). 
 
Table 1. Some differences between clusters and networks 
 Clusters Networks and firms’ 
associations 
Free-riders Yes No 
Membership No Yes 
Formality Informal Formal 
Access Inclusive Exclusive 
 
Table 1 presents the most important differences between clusters and other forms 
of firms’ associations. Both networks and clusters are agglomerations of firms with 
certain common interests. According to Porter (1998, p. 78) “clusters are geographic 
concentrations of interconnected companies and institutions in a particular field”. But, 
contrasting with networks, neither “membership” in an organisation nor cooperation is 
required to be “in” a cluster. Free riders, just by virtue of location, are able to benefit 
from non-exclusive external economies that spill over people and organizations 
localized under the cluster influence. Clusters are informal and inclusive while networks 
are formal and exclusive, with members gaining advantages over non-members 
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(Rosenfeld, 2005). In clusters, free riders are not only unavoidable but also, and perhaps 
more importantly, contribute to make cluster more powerful.  
Another recognized feature of the industry cluster concept is the proximity between 
businesses, which improves the exchange of knowledge and technologies. The benefits of 
proximity are well-known: Proximity makes greater access to tacit knowledge possible, 
opens opportunities for cooperation and collaboration and gives the clustered firms 
power to influence customers, markets, or policies. Proximity also gives higher access 
to experienced labour and allows firms to be more familiarized with competitors’ 
products and processes and to check own innovation and targets. In spite of the 
influence of recent innovations, as Internet and overnight delivery, proximity go on 
being helpful for mapping the growth of territorial innovation systems (Morgan, 2004) 
and even crucial for some production inputs as key equipment and components that are 
knowledge-intensive and/or result from interactive research and design (Rosenfeld, 
2005).  
But the importance of proximity in the transfer of tacit knowledge does not depend 
solely on geographical distance, as traditional explanations of the time and cost 
advantages of co-location tend to conclude (Gertler, 2003). Although geographic co-
location increases the probability of interaction does occur, proximity has also a 
relational dimension (Boschma, 2005). This is important to keep in mind since the 
exchange of strategically important information and knowledge requires mutual trust 
between the parties. In this sense, proximity is very related with the social capital 
concept highlighted by Putnam (1993) when he analyses the Italian economy. 
So, the proximity that is the key characteristic of a region possesses not only a 
spatial (geographical) dimension, but also a relational dimension. This involves aspects 
such as trust and understanding (Boschma, 2005). Although much of the literature 
agrees that spatial proximity often generates, or at least encourages, the emergence of 
relational proximity, this is neither an automatic nor an instantaneous result from 
geographic proximity, because trust between the actors is basically an effect of how 
long a particular relationship lasts, how frequent communication between the actors is, 
and whether they engage in repeated collaborations with the same actors (Nilsson, 
2008). So, despite how close two actors are in terms of geographical location, a lack of 
 7 
trust between them can lead to the failure of wished interaction and knowledge 
exchange.  
In the case of the tacit dimension of knowledge, labour mobility between 
organisations is probably one of the most common channels for knowledge transfer 
between organisations in a region. Labour mobility also has a clear territorial dimension 
since the mobility of individuals between regions, and even more so between countries, 
is very limited. However, the experience of human resources has remained a primary 
reason of clustering (Krugman, 1991). Firms depend on a continuous flow of workers 
skilled with the necessary ability, and with the knowledge of the business, which are 
needed to both routine and unforeseen situations. In every cluster not only a sufficient 
provision of technicians, sales staff, network organization, but also a labour force 
experienced on the specific milieu in which the cluster functions are crucial. This is 
very hard to get when policy tries to create an entirely new cluster. 
On the other hand, the evidence suggests spontaneity in clusters emergence. As 
shown by Rosenfeld (2005: 9), clusters emerge out of a solid foundation that is either 
embedded in existing companies, local expertise, or some special resources. The 
world’s best-known clusters have a long history and were spontaneous until they 
reached a sufficient level of activity. This suggests some sample bias in analyses of 
cluster benefits: usually, only the clusters that call attention are studied and many 
potential clusters disappear before they constitute case studies. Perhaps this fact can 
explain some controversy about the positive effects of clusters. In fact, if some 
researchers as Baptista and Swann (1998) conclude that innovation, entry and growth 
tend to be stronger in clusters and that firms located in strong clusters are more likely to 
innovate, others (e.g., Perry, 2010a) state that, in practice, there is no strong evidence 
that the businesses located in a cluster gain an advantage over those that do not. 
To sum up, economic history shows that the origins of clusters are diverse and 
wide-ranging: we find clusters that result from one or two successful companies with 
employees with an entrepreneurial vision; or from the expansion of value added chains 
around very large firms; or even from efforts by laid off employees to use their 
competencies in innovative ways. But, although their origin may be varied, spontaneity, 
relational dimension of proximity, tacit knowledge, interdependence and some 
informality are key characteristics of all of the best-known. All of these characteristics 
 8 
are hardly created or manipulated by policy. So a policy that has as the main aim the 
creation of clusters is of difficult concretisation. However, difficulty doesn’t necessary 
means impossibility or ineffectiveness of that policy. It means the need of a conscious 
effort to study and overcome the arising problems. 
 
 
3. The difficult bridge: from theory to policy  
 
As noted in the Introduction, the idea of clusters and cluster policy became popular in the 
policy debate following the publication of Porter’s analyses about competitiveness, at the dawn 
of the 1990s. But, contrasting with such popularity, the resulting policy inferences are much 
more controversial. Although Porter's definition of clusters as “geographic concentrations of 
interconnected companies, specialized suppliers, service providers, firms in related industries, and 
associated institutions (e.g. universities, standards agencies, trade associations) in a particular 
field that compete but also cooperate” (Porter, 2000 p. 15) has become one of the most widely used 
in the cluster rhetoric, the consensus ends when policy needs an operative definition. Apart from the 
idea that the presence of a cluster requires the analysis of the performance of a given industry to 
be made in close relation with the performance of related sectors and institutions, there are 
many ambiguities surrounding the cluster concept, and its relationship with regional economic 
performance is poorly studied.  
Indeed, there is no consensual definition of cluster from a policy point of view. 
Some consider “The cluster concept as, in fact, a specific type of a much larger family 
of “systems of innovation” approaches, or as reduced-scale national innovation systems 
(Roelandt and Hertog, 1999). The common starting-point of this perspective is “the 
assumption that, in order to innovate successfully, firms need a network of suppliers, 
customers and knowledge-producing agents” (Roelandt and Hertog, 1999: 414). As 
results from an OECD book of Proceedings on Cluster policy (OECD, 1999), the 
concept of cluster used in different countries is so diverse as either Innovation systems 
(Canada, Mexico, Spain) or regional systems of innovation (UK), networks of 
production, networks of innovation etc. (Australia, Belgium, Switzerland); value chains 
and networks (USA), value chains and networks of production (Netherlands, Norway); 
industrial districts (Austria). 
Of course there is a large literature about clusters (Asheim and Isaksen, 1997; Feser, 
1998a, 1998b; Harrison, 1992; Heidenreich, 1996; Isaksen, 1997; Jacobs and de Man, 1996; 
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Kaufman et al., 1994; Park and Markusen, 1995; Steiner, 1998), and from the work of these, 
and many other authors, have resulted a refined analysis. However, many problems came across 
in translating the sophisticated and commonly understood analysis into effective policy. 
First, there are some misunderstandings about how to consider cluster policy. While some 
policy makers consider cluster policy as a specific policy instrument, other analysts view 
clusters as only an opportunity to apply a different guiding principle. In the latter interpretation 
the cluster policy consists of a better comprehension of the dynamic potential for growth of an 
industrial agglomeration. It means taking a closer look at complementarities within given or 
potential economic structures, helping to define priorities in regional development programmes 
and to fine-tune the supply of public research and educational institutions (Peneder, 1999: 354). 
Second, while the studies on clusters state that they may generate knowledge 
spillovers and enhanced innovation (Camagni, 1991; Cooke, 2002; Maskell and 
Malmberg, 1999; Porter, 1998), the channels of knowledge transmission either remain 
unclear (Tödtling et al., 2009) or are described as multiple and varied. In the letter case, 
the channels may be, for instance, patents or scientific articles (Jaffe et al., 1993), 
observation and imitation of competitors (Malmberg and Maskell, 2002), and 
development of spin-offs or the relocating of qualified labour (Keeble and Wilkinson, 
2000).  
Also other analyses emphasize other perspectives on the sources of knowledge 
spillovers. For instance, in studying the US semiconductor industry, Ketelhöhn (2006) 
classified the sources of spillovers in four main categories: buyers (Morris, 1990; 
Smith, 2000; Leslie, 2000), suppliers and related industries (Morris, 1990, Macher et 
al., 1998), competitors (Braun and McDonald, 1978), and academic institutions (Braun 
and McDonald, 1978; Morris, 1990; Saxenian, 1994).  
Other authors explain dynamic externalities as resulting from processes of localised 
learning (Maskell et al., 1998; Maskell and Malmberg, 1999; Malmberg and Maskell, 
2006). This means that learning appears as the key way of transmitting knowledge in 
territorially industrial agglomerations and, consequently, to know how and under what 
principles knowledge can be transmitted is decisive for designing and implementing an 
effective regional policy.  
The localized learning can occur between many entities and through multiple 
processes, such as learning by doing, learning by using, learning by interacting. It 
involves three facets: horizontal, vertical and multi-level learning. The horizontal 
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learning is performed between firms mostly belonging to the same industry and 
providing similar goods and services. At this level, the relationship between firms is a 
composite of competition and cooperation, for short, coopetition3. As the similar 
producing conditions and the existence of a “common language” benefit the 
communication and knowledge transfer, the learning process consists of comparing, 
observing and imitating each other. Proximity offers the firms the possibility of 
conveniently and freely observing and evaluating the innovation activities of others, 
which reduce the cognitive distance and enhance the absorptive capability of clustering 
firms. 
Vertical learning refers to forward and backward interactions of firms located in 
different points of the value chain, i.e., the learning between providers and consumers 
and the learning between producers and suppliers. By keeping a close contact with 
users, clustering firms can acquire timely market information (Malmberg and Power 
2005). Especially, the sophisticated buyers usually ask for the superior quality and high 
reliable production, which contribute to design and upgrade production. On the other 
hand, the backward learning helps firms to acquire complementary technology to 
upgrade their design and to profit from the effects of their provider’s R&D. In clusters, 
owing to long-term cooperation and high trust, the clients and the suppliers are able to 
communicate each other widely and freely, which facilitates the exchange of open 
information and helps to solve common problems. 
Multi-level learning refers to the interactive learning between firms and other 
local actors, such as the local governments, universities, public research institutes and 
other organizations. These organizations provide local firms with all kind of services 
and infrastructure, which promote knowledge-sharing and cooperation. Especially as for 
the knowledge and technology infrastructure, university and public research institutes 
not only perform a role in education, training and technology transfer but also create 
new ideas, knowledge and technology. 
In sum, although the cluster analysis can present a huge amount of mechanisms 
that explain how clusters are associated to competitiveness and innovation, these 
features have been more fully exploited in economic analyses than in the design of 
                                                 
3
 While the competition can focus on the common raw material, labour force and goods market, the 
cooperation is more likely on the creation of a common market, the establishment and maintenance of a 
common brand and so on. 
 11 
policies (Bergman and Feser, 1999). Given the large quantity of channels and the 
diversity of sources of positive externalities, it is understandable the non-existence of a 
single, predefined path to be followed in the implementation of cluster promotion 
initiatives (Ceglie et al., 1999: 286). In fact, we face a new difficulty, which now results 
from the distinct processes of theory and policy, but once more this doesn’t mean the 
impossibility of cluster policy, this only means the need to bridge the sophisticated 
cluster analysis with the more practical in nature cluster policy. Anyway, if the sources 
of positive externalities are so evident and abundant as the cluster analysis highlights, 
market fails in providing efficient allocation of resources and, consequently, policy has 
a role to play in efficiency and growth grounds. 
 
 
4. Cluster policy and regional context 
An important characteristic highlighted in recent literature about Innovation is 
the mutual embeddedness between institutions and organizations i.e., firms and other 
organizations are strongly influenced and shaped by institutions. Organizations can be 
said to be ‘embedded’ in an institutional environment or set of rules, which include the 
legal system, norms, standards, etc. But institutions are also ‘embedded’ in 
organizations. Hence, there is a complex two-way relationship of mutual embeddedness 
between institutions and organizations, and this relationship influences innovation 
processes and thereby also both the performance and change of systems of innovation. 
(Edquist and Johnson, 1997). The institutions shape (and are shaped by) the actions of 
the organizations, and so cluster support initiatives need to be flexible and in tune with the 
characteristics of the environment where firms operate.  
But, on the other hand, clusters should be thought of embedded in the territory and so it 
is necessary to know the regional context where clusters exist or should be inserted. So, the 
design of a regional cluster policy forces the answer to another fundamental question: Is the 
cluster policy aimed at improving the current characteristics of the region or, on the contrary, at 
transforming regional characteristics as, for instance, specialization, openness to foreign trade or 
public-private relationships. Anyway, the answer needs a previous analysis of the regional 
context, which can be made using two strands of the literature: either the industrial districts 
perspective or the regional innovation systems approach.  
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a) Industrial districts 
Markusen (1996) identified four distinct types of industrial agglomerations that 
differ by industry dynamic, corporate priorities, government involvement, financing, 
and employment structure: a) Marshallian-Italianate industrial district; b) Hub-and-
spoke district; c) satellite platform district and d) State-anchored industrial district.  
According to Markusen (1996) a skilled and flexible labor force that is committed to 
the region and deep networks defines Marshallian-Italianate districts. These characteristics 
allow Marshallian-Italianate regions to identify and support emerging industries, and to 
respond quickly to economic and technology shifts. These environments tend to develop in 
regions without a history of economic dominance from one or several leading corporations 
because they require effective labour division, to which established companies might 
oppose. For instance the Marshallian-Italianate features apparent in the Shanghai region 
help to explain the emergence of high-tech clusters in proxy Chinese cities in southern 
Jiangsu and northern Zhejiang provinces (Walenza-Slabe, 2012).  
In Hub-and-Spoke districts, i.e., in regions where one or a few large companies 
dominate the regional economy, suppliers accumulate to meet demand from the leading 
companies, and over time the economic activity may attract new, unrelated industries. 
These environments tend to be company-centric, with employees devoted to companies 
rather than the region as a whole. Companies tend to be highly self-sufficient and are thus 
generally disinterested in cooperation with other regional companies, who may be 
competitors. They are more likely to seek strategic partnerships with outside companies. 
Due to the prevalence of large vertical companies and mass markets, Walenza-Slabe 
(2012) sees in Beijing and Shanghai regions illustrative examples of Hub-and-Spoke 
regions’ features.  
Satellite Industrial districts are often promoted by central governments as a means 
of developing target regions. Local industry tends to be dominated by the subsidiaries or 
suppliers of outside companies, who may be domestic or foreign. Inter-company 
cooperation is generally weak due to the lack of effective networks. However, company 
engagement in the region tends to be stable and may eventually lead the region towards a 
Hub-and-Spoke environment as the region gains in importance. Satellite regions face 
unique growth disputed due to their reliance on external financing, strategic direction and 
technical expertise. This type of industrial district is more likely to be associated to a policy 
targeted to create new clusters than to a policy for cluster development. For instance, the 
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Chengdu region illustrates a Satellite environment due to its role as a regional hub in the 
government’s policy of industrializing western China (Walenza-Slabe, 2012).  
The business environments of State-Anchored districts are deeply influenced by 
government institutions and revenue and so regional economic growth is driven by the 
government policies that allocate funding. Although the State-Anchored districts tend to be 
structurally similar to Hub-and-Spoke regions there is a fundamental difference: the local 
economy is dominated by government spending rather than by large corporations. 
Consequently a top-down cluster policy has more chances of being succeeded in State-
Anchored districts than in other types of industrial districts. The capital city regions are 
frequent examples of State-Anchored economies, since the majority of large corporations 
locate their headquarters in the capital city by many reasons and among them with the 
intention of improving access to government bureaucracies (Walenza-Slabe, 2012).  
 
 
b) Regional Innovation Systems 
Also the type of RIS (Regional Innovation System) must be taken in account in the 
implementation of a cluster policy. Let’s illustrate with the Asheim and Gertler’s (2005) 
taxonomy of RIS. According to this classification there are three types of RIS: 
territorially embedded regional innovation system, also recognized as “grassroots RIS”; 
regionally networked innovation system, also called “network RIS”; and regionalized 
national innovation system, also known as “dirigiste RIS”. 
The territorially embedded regional innovation system corresponds to a system 
where firms (mainly those employing synthetic knowledge) base their innovation 
activity on localized learning processes stimulated by proximity without much direct 
interaction with knowledge organizations. This is the case of many South European 
Industrial Districts, as for instance the Italian ones. In “grassroots RIS” as in Marshallian-
Italianate regions (Markusen, 1996) the flexible labour force committed to the region and the 
deep networks allow to identify and support emerging industries, and to respond quickly to 
economic and technology shifts. 
On the other hand, a regionally networked innovation system is a regional 
agglomeration of firms surrounded by a regional supporting institutional infrastructure. 
It is usually the result of policy intervention to increase innovation capacity and 
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collaboration in cooperation with local universities and R&D institutes. The basic idea 
is that technology transfer agencies and service centers supplement firms’ competence. 
In this type of RIS the policy intervention is used not only to increase collective 
innovation capacity but it may also be useful in counteracting technological “lock-in” 
within regional clusters of firms. The “network RIS” is most typical of Germany, 
Austria, and the Nordic countries. 
Finally, the regionalized national innovation system is the result of a process of 
clustering R&D laboratories of large firms and governmental research institutes in 
planned “science parks”. It is a model where exogenous actors and relationships play a 
larger role. That is, innovation activity takes place primarily with actors outside the 
region (lack of local and regional embeddeness) and significant parts of the industry are 
more integrated into national or international innovation systems. The most notorious 
examples are the technopoles of France or the science parks in Japan and Taiwan. In the 
“dirigiste RIS” as in State-Anchored regions (Markusen, 1996), a top-down cluster 
policy is more likely to be succeeded than in territorially embedded regional innovation 
system.  
 
 
5. Two models of cluster policy 
 
But, if there are several types of industrial agglomerations and policy should be 
designed in tune with targeted industrial districts or Regional Innovation Systems, it is likely a 
diversity of cluster policies. Also if there is no consensual definition of cluster it is 
expected that in practice, countries’ cluster policy approaches differ. However, in spite 
of some differences in underling concepts there is a notable consensus in OECD 
countries: the preference for a bottom-up approach. This focuses on fostering dynamic 
market functioning and removing market imperfections; the foundation lies in market-
induced initiatives, with the government acting as a catalyst and mediator but with no 
setting of national priorities (the Netherlands, the United States). When the top-down 
approach, is used (for instance, in some Nordic countries) it has an exceptional 
character. In this case, government (in consultation with industry and research agencies) 
sets some national priorities, formulates a challenging vision for the future and decides 
on the actors to be involved in the conversation. But, after national priorities have been 
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set and the dialogue groups implemented, the clustering process becomes a market-led 
process, with little government intervention (Roelandt and Hertog, 1999).  
In our view this preference for bottom-up approach is more ideological than 
based in sound economic principles, reflecting the farthest position of a pendulum 
movement. Development policy has always been subject to fashions commanded by 
ideology. During the 1950s and 1960s, industrial policy, import-substitution and the 
“big push”, were the straight cries of policy makers both in developed and developing 
nations. In the 1970s these ideas were replaced with more market-friend and outward-
orientation approaches. By the late 1980s, a set of policy principles usually known as 
“the Washington Consensus” (Williamson, 1990) obtained a remarkable convergence of 
views among international institutions in charge of dealing with aid and finance 
problems of developing countries. In spite of many criticisms (Pessoa, 2004; Rodrik, 
2003) these principles, initially designed for the developing world and put in place in 
some Latin America countries, spread to the high-income economies and remain at the 
core of today’s conventional understanding of a desirable policy framework for 
economic growth in the Occidental World.  
So additionally to some developing countries, also in developed world the 
principles of the Washington Consensus, and particularly the principles of privatisation 
and deregulation, paved the way of a change in development policy and consequently 
the 1990s have seen a shift away from “picking winners” towards “letting the market 
pick winners”. This change affected the design of development policies and the cluster 
policy is not an exception. In fact, such principles are underling the way as cluster 
policy is seen in the OECD countries. Accordingly, the OECD model of cluster-based 
industrial policy-making is based on the following prescriptions (Roelandt and Hertog, 
1999: 420-421): 
1. The creation of clusters should not be government-driven but rather should result 
from market-induced and market-led initiatives. 
2. Government policy should not be strongly oriented to directly subsidising 
industries and firms or to limiting rivalry in the marketplace. 
3. Government policy should shift away from direct intervention towards indirect 
inducement. Public interference in the marketplace only can be justified in the 
presence of a clear market or systemic failure. Even if clear market and systemic 
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imperfections exist, it cannot necessarily be concluded that government 
intervention will improve the situation. 
4. Government should not try to take the direct lead or ownership in cluster 
initiatives, but should work as a catalyst and broker, bringing actors together and 
supplying support structures and incentives to facilitate the clustering and 
innovation process. 
5. Cluster policy should not ignore small and emerging clusters; nor should it focus 
only on “classic”, existing clusters. 
6. Clusters should not be created from “scratch”.  
 
These prescriptions are all negative. They show what government should not to do. 
But the question is: if government is dealing with creating and supporting local 
industrial clusters, what is the role that government must play? According to the OECD 
principles above, policy should consist of creating favourable framework conditions for 
an efficient and dynamic functioning of markets only. But, given the extensive amount 
of positive externalities highlighted by many authors, cluster policy is just motivated by 
the market failures. And when market fails, policy must play the role that market fails to 
play. In fact, cluster and networks can be seen, to some extent, as public goods reducing 
transaction costs by internalising transactions involving external economies and so policy 
measures should correct market failures implied by the existence of these positive externalities. 
Economic theory teaches that they call for, and justify, active public policies. 
In our view the Asian model is more effective in creating and supporting clusters and 
consequently in fostering economic growth. In the Asian model policy is based on a 
sequence of actions described by Akifumi Kuchiki (2005, p. 1) as the “flowchart 
approach”. This approach to industrial cluster policy “emphasizes the importance of the 
ordering of policy measures. The flow of policy implementation is to establish an 
industrial zone, to invite an anchor company, and to promote its related companies to 
invest in the industrial zone” (Kuchiki, 2005, p. 1). This approach is usually 
accompanied by a precise formalization of incentives and procedures intended to aid 
foreign business and attract FDI. The example of Shanghai is elucidative. Through the 
Shanghai Foreign Investment Development Board (2011), the Shanghai municipality 
has formalized incentives, policies and procedures intended to aid foreign business and 
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attract FDI. First, some Municipal administrative agencies were created and the 
assistance available to foreign investors was clearly defined (see table 2). 
 
Table 2. Functions of Shanghai Municipal administrative agencies 
Shanghai Municipal administrative 
agencies: 
Function: 
Foreign Investment Commission Financial oversight 
Development and Reform Commission Project approval 
Economic Commission Aligning FDI with local development goals 
Commission of Science and Technology Technology partnerships and “technology 
for market access” deals 
Source: SFIDB (2011), article 4. 
 
Also precise conditions for investment and incentives are typified in Shanghai 
Foreign Investment Development Board (SFIDB, 2011), for instance: a) incentives are 
only available for investments of more than $2 million in foreign capital and if 80% of 
enterprise staff is full-time professional research and development personnel (Article 5); 
b) exemptions from customs duties and value added taxes on imports for approved 
companies (Article 6); c) up to 50% deduction of taxable income for approved 
companies (Article 7); d) land grants and subsidized rent for approved R&D facilities 
(Article 8). By clarifying the incentives available to foreign investors and the constraints 
under which they must operate, Shanghai and other large cities have been succeeded in 
attracting capital and new business by reducing the uncertainty of operating in a foreign 
country so singular as China.  
But the sequence of actions is accompanied by the creation of “sufficient 
conditions” for the success of the cluster model. First, both organizations in the local 
public sector and firms in the private sector provide for capacity to industrial zones 
respecting to physical infrastructure, institutions, and human resources. Second, 
industrial cluster policy to provide industrial zones and capacity as semi-public goods 
can enhance regional economic growth in cases where an anchor firm operates under 
increasing returns to scale4. Third, the minimum optimal size of production is defined 
                                                 
4
 Of course, this approach is facilitated by the fact that markets for sales in China are at an early stage of 
development and large enough for anchor companies to attain increasing returns to scale. However, 
increasing returns can be attained in many other countries and regions. 
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according to the economies of scale and depending on the size of fixed capital of the 
related companies of anchor companies. 
 
Table 3. Contrasting the OECD with the Asian model 
OECD model Asian (except Japan) model 
Bottom-up is the rule  In the origin, is always a top-down 
approach 
Top-down is exceptional Combines well the top-down approach 
with the bottom-up approach. 
Government acts only as a catalyst and 
mediator 
Government also sets national priorities 
Government builds industrial zones and for 
each one invites an anchor company 
Clusters should not be created from 
“scratch”. 
Creating entirely new clusters 
 
Table 3 shows the most important differences between the two approaches. The 
Asian model combines well the top-down approach with the bottom-up approach. In the 
origin is always a top-down approach: the government acts not only as a catalyst and 
mediator but also setting national priorities and devising a challenging vision for the 
future. The flow of policy implementation is to establish an industrial zone, to invite an 
anchor company, and to promote its related companies to invest in the industrial zone. 
Next, the recipient country’s government reduces its role in order to promote 
competition. It thereby transfers greater authority to local governments and makes more 
use of the public corporations and state enterprises at the same time as it gradually gives 
an increasing role to the market. The progress and spreading out of clusters and network 
creation in Asia by both national (and local) public enterprises and multinational 
corporations are considered fundamentals to the upgrading of Asia’s industrial 
structures. 
On the other hand, in OECD countries a hands-off approach is preferred. With a 
significant distrust in industrial policy, these countries take a passive attitude waiting for 
projects presented by private initiatives. They maintain significant bureaucratic 
organizations, with roles of writing regulations, classify projects and attributing money 
to the approved projects. The capacity of originating clusters is only a criterion among 
many others. But if externalities are not accounted in the profitability of firms, why the 
projects presented by private agents must include clusters as a decisive factor? 
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As previously noted the importance of cluster policy results from positive 
externalities associated to the clustering mode of production (Pessoa, 2011), which 
make increasing returns likely. If private initiative is not aware of the external effects of 
its action it doesn’t orient projects according to the capacity they have for generating 
clusters. In the OECD model government waits for the action of private initiative while 
this waits for government. The result is a low level equilibrium, where clusters only 
appear by fortuity. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The cluster policy approach gives policy makers better chances for getting their 
priorities right. However, our literature review shows that both the cluster concept is 
usually poorly defined and very often some cluster characteristics, which are difficult to 
be manipulated by policy (spontaneity, informality, tacit knowledge, etc.), are 
overlooked. Additionally, the vagueness in the definition of cluster concept makes 
difficult the policy evaluation at the same time as the appealing of the “cluster brand” 
drives to an exaggerated optimism in the expected effects of cluster policy.  
But this paper revolved around another paradox: why so many policy makers in 
the OECD countries use the clusters rhetoric inspired in the competitive advantages of 
Porter but, in practice, don’t use the policy instruments needed to propagate clusters? 
The answer to this question is closely associated to the policy makers’ faith on the 
superiority of market over the government policy. However, this faith is more motivated 
by ideological convictions than by scientific principles. The cluster policy is not an 
exception to this hands-off approach that is spreading in the OECD countries giving 
policy a shift away from “picking winners” towards “letting the market pick winners”. But if 
this is the case why policy is needed? This paper provides arguments that show this is not 
the most appropriate strategy to boost economic development, as the contrast between 
OECD regions and the ones localized in the “Asian triangle of growth” demonstrate. 
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